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Abstract
Background There is growing evidence of a reluctance to allocate
health care solely on the basis of maximizing quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs). Stated preference methods can be used to elicit
preferences for eﬃciency vs. equity in the allocation of health-care
resources.
Objective To compare discrete choice experiment (DCE) and con-
stant-sum paired comparison (CSPC) methods for eliciting societal
preferences.
Methods Over a series of choice pairs, DCE respondents allocated
a ﬁxed budget to one preferred group and CSPC respondents allo-
cated budget percentages between the groups. Questionnaires were
compared in terms of completion rates, preference consistency,
dominant preferences and derived attribute importance.
Results There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportions that
rated the questionnaires somewhat or extremely diﬃcult, but a sig-
niﬁcantly greater proportion completed the DCE compared to the
CSPC. Preference consistency was also higher in the DCE. The
incidence of dominant preferences, including for aggregate
QALYs, was low and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between question-
naires. Similarly, no CSCP respondents equalized budgets or out-
comes in every task. Final health state was the most important
attribute in both questionnaires, but the rankings diverged for the
other attributes. Notably, the total patients’ treated attribute was
important in the CSPC but insigniﬁcant in the DCE, perhaps
reﬂecting a ‘prominence eﬀect’.
Conclusions Despite lower completion rates and preference consis-
tency, CSPC may oﬀer advantages over DCE in eliciting preferences
over the distribution of resources and/or outcomes as well as attribute
levels, avoiding extreme ‘all-or-nothing’ distributions and possibly
aligning respondent attention more closely with a societal perspective.
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Introduction
The conventional quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) maximization approach to health-care
priority setting explicitly assumes that within a
ﬁxed budget, the only factors that are relevant
to the societal value of health care are the
absolute gain in health-related quality of life,
the duration of the beneﬁt and the number of
patients receiving treatment. An increase in
any of these factors is associated with a pro-
portional increase in value.1 There is growing
evidence, however, of a reluctance to allocate
health care solely on the basis of maximizing
QALYs and a willingness to sacriﬁce eﬃciency
in exchange for equity or ‘distributive justice’
goals.1–3
Choice-based stated preference (SP) meth-
ods can be used to measure the strength and
direction of preferences for eﬃciency and
equity in health care on a cardinal scale by
asking respondents to trade-oﬀ between alter-
natives on the basis of diﬀerent attributes
and levels.4,5 But whereas conventional elici-
tations of welfare ask individuals to judge
how they would feel about being in a certain
condition or health state, elicitations of socie-
tal welfare require respondents to consider
interpersonal trade-oﬀs and how they would
feel about others being in a certain condi-
tion.6
Reviews by Ryan et al.5 and Mullen7 iden-
tify a number of methods for eliciting societal
preferences, but two speciﬁc choice-based SP
methods are compared here. First, discrete
choice experiments (DCEs) ask respondents to
choose a single preferred option from two or
more alternatives, and over a series of choice
tasks can elicit preferences for the diﬀerent
attribute levels that deﬁne each alternative.
DCEs are reasonably straightforward tasks,
conceptually similar to many decisions respon-
dents make on a daily basis and are increas-
ingly common in health economic
applications.5,8,9 They have been used in a
number of recent elicitations of societal values
for priority setting in health care.10–15
Second, constant-sum paired comparisons
(CSPCs) ask respondents to allocate a ﬁxed
budget between two alternatives.* In contrast
to the ‘pick one’ nature of a DCE, respondents
can choose to allocate the entire budget to
alternative A, to alternative B, or to some com-
bination of the two, including an equal split.
Schwappach16 argues that the approach is
unique in connecting budget constraints, health
outcomes and patient characteristics, and
Ryan5 suggests that the approach has an
apparent simplicity and intuitive appeal. CSPC
has the additional advantage of being able to
identify preferences for speciﬁc resource alloca-
tions. For example, respondents may express a
preference for equality in the allocation of
resources or, depending on the attributes
included in the task, in outcomes. CSPC has
had more limited use than DCE in health eco-
nomic applications, but has been successfully
used to elicit societal preferences for eﬃciency
and equity in health care.16–21 Sample DCE
and CSPC tasks are shown in Appendix S1.
The response characteristics of CSPC have
not, to our knowledge, been directly compared
to DCE. To this end, the two methods were
compared as part of a pilot study intended to
identify the preferred technique for a larger
elicitation of preferences over the allocation of
societal health-care resources. The following
section outlines the experimental design and
data collection methods used in the elicitation,
as well as the criteria by which the two tech-
niques were compared. These criteria included
completion rates, respondent-rated diﬃculty,
preference consistency and the incidence of a
dominant preference for a speciﬁc choice attri-
bute. The estimation of preferences was not a
primary objective of this comparison, but a
simple analysis of the choice responses was
conducted conﬁrm the general feasibility of the
*CSPC is similar to constant-sum scaling (CSS), which pre-
sents a single alternative and asks respondents to allocate a
ﬁxed budget or points between attributes.7 Both CSPC and
CSS are sometimes referred to as ‘budget pie’ tasks.
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methods and to identify potential response
biases in the two formats.
Methods
Experimental design
An empirical ethics review of factors relevant
to the allocation of health-care resources
between patient groups22 identiﬁed four attri-
butes that had evidence of public support as
well as defensible ethical justiﬁcation: patient
age, health-related quality of life before and
after treatment, and the number of patients in
each group. Life expectancy without/before
treatment and life years gained with/after treat-
ment were also included to facilitate the calcu-
lation of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
as a summary measure of health gain, despite
ambiguous evidence around societal prefer-
ences for duration of health beneﬁt and the
QALY itself.1,2,22
A D-eﬃcient optimal fractional factorial
experimental design with 18 choice sets of two
alternatives each was developed using SAS
macros.23 The design started with a full factorial
candidate design of 6 attributes with three levels
each (see Table 1) and excluded combinations
where the net QALY gain with treatment was
negative, or health state and life expectancy were
unchanged before and after treatment. The ﬁnal
18 choice sets were divided into two blocks of 9
choice sets each, with no duplication between
the two blocks. Choice set 3 from each design
block was repeated to test preference consis-
tency, resulting in a total of 10 choice tasks pre-
sented–always in the same order–to each
respondent. The survey was simpliﬁed by using
block 1 for the DCE questionnaire and block 2
for the CSPC questionnaire, rather than ran-
domly assigning respondents to diﬀerent blocks
within each questionnaire. Although this simpli-
ﬁed questionnaire administration, it violates the
principles of optimal experimental design and
limits its overall eﬃciency.24
Data collection
Individuals were invited complete an online
questionnaire via a mass email to students at
the University of Sheﬃeld, Sheﬃeld, UK, and
posters and electronic announcements to stu-
dents, staﬀ and faculty at Dalhousie Univer-
sity, Halifax, Canada, and physicians and staﬀ
at Capital District Health Authority, Halifax,
Canada. The invitations, questionnaires and
analysis methods were approved by The Uni-
versity of Sheﬃeld, School of Health and
Related Research Ethics Committee and the
Capital District Health Authority Research
Ethics Board.
Potential respondents were randomized to
the DCE or CSPC questionnaire using a ran-
dom number algorithm. Sixty percent of poten-
tial respondents were assigned the CSPC
questionnaire to compensate for a lower
expected completion rate due to its greater cog-
nitive demand, with the remaining 40%
assigned the DCE. As each potential respon-
dent followed a link to participate, the assigned
questionnaire was recorded and used as the
denominator in calculating completion rates.
Respondents were asked to imagine them-
selves as a societal decision maker responsible
for allocating a ﬁxed budget between two
health-care programs. They were told that both
programs had the same cost and that the
Table 1 Attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Average age of
patients (Age)
10, 40, 70
Quality of life without/before
treatment (Initial utility)
0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Life expectancy without/before
treatment (Initial life expectancy)
1 month, 5 years,
10 years
Quality of life with treatment
(Final utility)
0.1, 0.5, 0.9
Change in life expectancy with
treatment (Life years gained)
1 year, 5 years,
10 years
Number of patients that could be
treated (Patients treated)
500, 2500, 5000
Aggregate QALYs gained was calculated for each choice scenario as
[final utility 9 (initial life expectancy + life years gained)  initial
utility 9 initial life expectancy] 9 total patients treated. The value of
aggregate QALYs gained in the experimental design ranged from 54
to 45 373, with a mean of 10 591.
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budget was large enough fund one program or
the other, but not both. The precise budget
and the cost of the programs were not speci-
ﬁed. Aggregate QALYs gained† was included
as part of each alternative to test respondent
consistency with the principles of QALY maxi-
mization, and a brief description of each attri-
bute was provided (see Appendix S1). The
concept of cost-eﬀectiveness was not intro-
duced, but given that both programs had the
same cost, some respondents may have inferred
that the program associated with the greatest
aggregate QALYs gained was also the more
cost-eﬀective option.
The DCE tasks asked respondents to allo-
cate the entire budget to a single alternative
and did not include an option to indicate indif-
ference between the alternatives. The CSPC
tasks asked respondents to allocate budget per-
centages between the two groups by moving a
slider. The number of patients treated and
aggregate QALYs gained in the CSPC alterna-
tives changed in proportion with the budget as
the respondent moved the slider (e.g. a 25%
budget allocation meant 25% of the potential
patients could be treated). Unlike the DCE,
respondents could express indiﬀerence between
the alternatives with a 50–50% budget alloca-
tion. Respondents could dropout at any stage,
and data were only collected from those
respondents who completed the entire ques-
tionnaire. See the Appendix S1 for sample
DCE and CSPC tasks.
Following the choice tasks, respondents were
asked to rate the importance of each attribute,
and the importance of an equal distribution of
resources, to their choices on a 0–10 scale (see
Appendix S1) and to separately rate the diﬃ-
culty of understanding the tasks and of answer-
ing the tasks on 7-point scales ranging from
extremely easy to extremely diﬃcult. Respon-
dents were also asked to indicate their gender
and age group and to voluntarily identify
themselves as a governmental decision maker
or academic expert, a physician and/or a fre-
quent health-care user (≥12 contacts in the past
12 months). These categories were not mutu-
ally exclusive, and each respondent may have
been in more than one category or none at all.
Preliminary interviews and informal focus
groups were used to reﬁne the wording and
presentation of the DCE and CSPC tasks as
well as the diﬃculty and importance ratings.
Survey comparisons
Completion rates
Diﬀerences in completion rates and stakeholder
and gender proportions were tested using a two-
sample Z-test of proportions. Age group pro-
portions were tested using a v2 test of indepen-
dence. On the assumption that the
randomization algorithm assigned an equal pro-
portion of each age, gender and stakeholder sub-
group to each questionnaire, diﬀerences in these
proportions were taken to indicate a diﬀerential
dropout rate among these groups. Throughout
the comparisons, multiple P-values were
adjusted for simultaneous comparisons using
Hommel’s method,25,26 and the analyses were
conducted with R, version 2.15.2 (R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).27
Respondent-rated difficulty
The proportions of DCE and CSPC respon-
dents who indicated that they found the ques-
tionnaire ‘somewhat diﬃcult’ or ‘extremely
diﬃcult’ to understand or to answer were com-
pared using a two-sample Z-test of proportions.
Preference consistency
Preference consistency was measured by includ-
ing a repeated task in each questionnaire–the
two alternatives presented as task 3 of each
block were reversed and represented as task 8.
Consistency required that respondents should
prefer the same alternative in the repeated task
as in the original. To compare the two methods
on a common basis, CSPC responses were
†Aggregate QALYs gained = [ﬁnal utility 9 (initial life
expectancy + life years gained)  initial utility 9 initial life
expectancy] 9 total patients treated.
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transformed to discrete choices based on which
alternative was allocated the majority of the
budget. Equal budget allocations were allowed,
but an equal allocation had to be made in both
tasks to be classiﬁed as consistent. The propor-
tion of consistent respondents in the two ques-
tionnaires was compared using a two-sample
Z-test of proportions.
Dominant preferences
A respondent was considered to have a domi-
nant preference for a particular attribute if
they always choose the alternative with the
higher (or lower) level of that attribute, regard-
less of the levels of the other attributes.28
Although such preferences are not inconsistent
with the axioms of choice theory,29,30 they do
violate the assumptions that underlie choice-
based stated preference methods: compensatory
decision making, which implies that a deterio-
ration in one attribute can be compensated for
by an improvement in another attribute, and
an additive utility function. Such preferences
cannot be represented by an indiﬀerence curve,
and as no trading takes place, marginal rates
of substitution have no meaning.28,31
To test for dominant preferences, a set of
ﬂags was created for each alternative in each
choice task. The ﬂags indicated whether or not
an alternative presented the ‘best’ or more pre-
ferred level of each attribute, based on expecta-
tions from the empirical ethics review.22 For
example, based on public support and an ethi-
cal justiﬁcation for prioritizing more severely ill
patients, if one alternative presented patients in
a more severe initial health state, that alterna-
tive was ﬂagged as ‘best’ (from the perspective
of the respondent) in the initial utility attribute;
the attribute ﬂag for the paired alternative was
set to zero. A respondent who invariably chose
the alternative with more severely ill patients
would have a correlation coeﬃcient of 1.0
between the choice ﬂag and the initial utility
ﬂag (perfect choice–attribute correlation).
Which end of the attribute scale each respon-
dent considered ‘best’ was not critical as this
only aﬀected the sign on the correlation
coeﬃcient, although this only holds where pre-
ferences are monotonically increasing or
decreasing over the attribute, as was assumed
here.
Constant-sum paired comparison responses
were transformed to discrete choices on the
basis of which program was allocated the
majority of the budget, and the attribute ﬂags
were set based on the potential number of
patients treated and QALYs gained if 100% of
the budget were allocated to that alternative.
CSPC alternatives that received a 50% budget
allocation were ﬂagged as ‘not chosen’ (i.e.
both alternatives were assigned a choice ﬂag of
zero) as neither alternative was considered to
be prioritized, but the impact of counting such
allocations as prioritizing the preferred attri-
bute level–under the rationale that respondents
gave at least equal priority to the preferred
attribute level–was also tested. As the outcome
of interest was the correlation between pairs of
nominal variables (i.e. choice and attribute
ﬂag), Kendall’s tau32 was used as the measure
of correlation and was estimated using the ltm
package.33
As respondents saw only a subset of possible
scenarios, it is not possible to say that an
observed dominant preference, deﬁned as per-
fect correlation between a respondent’s choices
and the level of a particular attribute, would
necessarily hold across all possible scenarios.28
To support the identiﬁcation of dominant pref-
erences, therefore, each respondent’s self-rated
attribute importance scores were converted to
rankings, and individuals with a perfect
choice–attribute correlation who also rated that
attribute as most important were considered to
have a dominant preference for that attribute.
The proportion of dominant preferences was
compared across the two questionnaires using
a two-sample Z-test.
Given that program cost was the same in
both alternatives, a dominant preference for
greater aggregate QALYs was, in eﬀect, a pref-
erence for the more cost-eﬀective alternative,
consistent with the principles of QALY maxi-
mization.1 However, in holding costs constant,
it is not possible to distinguish between a
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QALY-maximizing preference for the more
cost-eﬀective alternative and a dominant pref-
erence for aggregate QALYs regardless of cost.
Therefore, a dominant preference for aggregate
QALYs is necessary but not suﬃcient to con-
ﬁrm support for QALY maximization. The
mean number of QALY-maximizing choices
made by respondents to the two questionnaires
was compared using a two-sample t-test.
CSPC budget allocation preferences
As the ability to elicit preferences for speciﬁc
resource allocations is a key feature of the
CSPC, the distribution of allocation choices is
also presented. Based on the attributes pre-
sented in each task, CSPC respondents had the
opportunity to maximize the budget to one
program or the other or to split the budget
between the two programs in ways that could
equalize resources, patients treated or aggre-
gate QALYs gained.
In the case of an equal allocation of
resources, it was not possible in any single
CSPC task to distinguish between indiﬀerence
due to equality in the latent utility of the alter-
natives and a preference for equality regardless
of the attribute levels. As with the conﬁrmation
of dominant preferences discussed above,
therefore, respondents were only categorized as
having a dominant preference for equality if
they chose an equal 50–50% allocation across
all tasks and also ranked an equal distribution
of resources as the most important factor in
their choices.
Econometric analysis
The simple choice models assumed monotonic
preferences and linear main eﬀects, and
responses to the repeated task were excluded
from the analyses to avoid double-counting.
All respondents were included in the analysis,
including those with conﬁrmed dominant pref-
erences.30
The response variable in the CSPC analysis
was the budget allocated to alternative B less
the budget allocated to alternative A. If 100%
of the budget was allocated to alternative B,
DBudget = +100; if 100% was allocated to Pro-
gram A, DBudget = 100; and if the budget
was allocated 50–50%, DBudget = 0. The DCE
response variable was a 0, 1 ﬂag indicating
whether or not Program B was chosen.
Responses were modelled as a function of the
diﬀerences in the raw (i.e. continuous) attribute
levels, calculated as above. Aggregate QALYs
gained were excluded to avoid collinearity with
the other attributes. CSPC responses were
modelled using a double-bounded random
eﬀects Tobit to account for the censored
dependent variable and the panel structure of
the data,34 while DCE responses were modelled
using a binary random eﬀects probit to be as
comparable as possible with the CSPC model.
To allow for the broadest possible inclusion of
explanatory parameters in the models, a signiﬁ-
cance threshold of 0.10 was adopted and
P-values were not adjusted for multiple com-
parisons.35 The analyses were performed using
the censReg and pglm packages.36,37
Coeﬃcients from the DCE and CSPC mod-
els represent the change in latent utility, or the
change in the diﬀerence in latent utility, respec-
tively, associated with a 1-unit change in each
attribute. Due to this diﬀerence in interpreta-
tion, as well as diﬀerences in the variance scale
between the two models,38 these coeﬃcients are
not directly comparable. Instead, they were
compared on the basis of the relative contribu-
tion of each attribute to overall utility,39 calcu-
lated based on the most preferred and least
preferred level of each attribute, x:
Dvx ¼ ðbxÞmax  ðbxÞmin
where (bx)max is the utility associated with the
most preferred level of attribute x, (bx)min is
the utility associated with the least preferred
level of attribute x and Dv(x) is the net diﬀer-
ence. This attribute-speciﬁc contribution to
utility was divided by the diﬀerence in overall
utility between the ‘best’ scenario, based on the
most preferred level of each attribute, and the
‘worst’ scenario, based on the least preferred
level of each attribute:
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Relative Importance of x ¼ DvðxÞ
vmax  vmin
Marginal rates of substitution (MRS) were
also calculated as the ratio of the coeﬃcient of
each attribute to the coeﬃcient on life years
gained and represented the average willingness
to sacriﬁce individual life year gains for a 1-
unit change in the level of a particular attri-
bute.40 A negative sign indicates that respon-
dents preferred a lower level of an attribute,
while a positive sign indicates a preference for
a higher level.
Results
Completion rates
A total of 604 individuals chose to participate:
348 (58%) were randomized to the CSPC, and
256 (42%) were randomized to the DCE.
Completion rates and respondent characteris-
tics are shown in Table 2. A signiﬁcantly
greater proportion of individuals randomized
to the DCE completed a questionnaire com-
pared with individuals randomized to the
CSPC (P < 0.001). There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the age group or gender distribu-
tions or in the proportion of respondents who
identiﬁed themselves as doctors or frequent
health-care users. A substantially lower pro-
portion of respondents identiﬁed themselves as
decision makers among completed CSPC
questionnaires, although this diﬀerence was
not signiﬁcant after adjusting for multiple
comparisons.
Respondent-rated difficulty
As shown in Table 3, there was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two questionnaires in
the proportion that rated the tasks ‘somewhat
diﬃcult’ or ‘extremely diﬃcult’ to understand
among all respondents who submitted a com-
pleted questionnaire. A greater proportion of
decision makers found the CSPC ‘somewhat
diﬃcult’ or ‘extremely diﬃcult’ to understand
compared to the DCE, but this diﬀerence was
not statistically signiﬁcant. There were no nota-
ble diﬀerences in the diﬃculty of understanding
in the other stakeholder subgroups. Table 4
shows no notable or statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences within respondent subgroups in the
diﬃculty of answering the DCE and CSPC.
Consistency in the repeated task
Ninety-six percent of respondents to the DCE
(148/154) preferred the same program (includ-
ing three consistent ‘no answers’) in the origi-
nal and the repeated task, while 79% (119/150)
of CSPC respondents allocated the majority of
the budget to the same program or preferred
an equal allocation of resources in both tasks.
The diﬀerence in the proportion of consistent
respondents between the two questionnaires
was statistically signiﬁcant (diﬀerence = 17%;
P < 0.001).
Dominant preferences
Excluding three individuals who always chose
‘no answer’ in the DCE, the proportion of
Table 2 Completion rates and respondent characteristics by questionnaire
DCE (%) CSPC (%) P-value Adjusted P
Overall completion rate 154/256 (60%) 150/348 (43%) <0.001 <0.001
Self-identified stakeholders, N (%)
‘Decision maker’ 33 (21%) 18 (12%) 0.04 0.20
‘Doctors’ 35 (23%) 35 (23%) 1.00 1.00
‘Frequent user’ 14 (9%) 18 (12%) 0.52 1.00
Demographics, N (%)
Female 113 (74%) 107 (71%) 0.77 1.00
Mean age* 31.5 33.2 0.65 1.00
*Mean age was calculated using the mid-point of age groups; P-value for v2 test of independence.
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respondents who always chose the alternative
with the preferred level of a particular attribute
was 9% in the DCE (14/151) and 5% in the
CSPC (7/150); the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant
(P = 0.27, adjusted- P = 0.34). The most fre-
quent perfectly correlated attribute in the DCE
and CSPC was ﬁnal health state (9/14) and life
years gained (6/7), respectively. Among respon-
dents with at least one perfectly correlated attri-
bute, seven DCE (5%) and three CSPC (2%)
respondents also ranked that attribute as the
most important factor in their choices, taken as
conﬁrmation of a dominant preference. Again,
this diﬀerence was not statistically signiﬁcant
(P = 0.34, adjusted-P = 0.34). Counting equal
budget allocations in the CSPC as prioritizing
the dominant attribute increased the proportion
of respondents with perfect choice–attribute cor-
relations and dominant preferences to 11 and
5%, respectively, but the diﬀerences between the
CSPC and DCE were still not signiﬁcant.
Three additional DCE respondents had a
perfect correlation between choice and total
patients treated, but due to an error in the
database attribute importance, ratings were not
recorded for the ‘number of patients treated’
attribute. These respondents were not counted
among the individuals with conﬁrmed domi-
nant preferences, but it is possible that up to
10 DCE respondents (7%) may have had a
dominant preference, but this would not
change the insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between the
DCE and CSPC.
With speciﬁc reference to aggregate QALY
gains, only one respondent, from the DCE
questionnaire, chose the QALY-maximizing
alternative in every task. This individual also
ranked QALYs as the most important attri-
bute, conﬁrming a dominant preference for
aggregate QALYs. On average, DCE respon-
dents chose the QALY-maximizing alternative
in 6.3 of 10 tasks, compared to 5.4 tasks of 10
among CSPC respondents (P < 0.001); both
were slightly but signiﬁcantly greater than the
ﬁve choices of 10 that would be expected by
chance alone, given that one alternative in each
choice pair maximized QALYs gained
(adjusted-P < 0.001 in both comparisons).
CSPC distributional preferences
Figure 1 shows that the modal CSPC alloca-
tion (18% of all responses) maximized the bud-
get to one program or the other, while the next
most common allocation (7%) equalized the
budget between the two programs. Two per-
cent of CSPC respondents (3/150) maximized
the budget in every task, and 11% (16/150)
maximized the budget in ﬁve or more of their
10 choices. No respondents equalized budgets,
patients or QALYs in more than ﬁve of their
choices.
Table 4 Respondents rating the questionnaires ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely difficult’ to answer
DCE (%) CSPC (%) P-value Adjusted P
All respondents 100/154 (65%) 99/150 (66%) 0.94 1.00
‘Decision maker’ 25/33 (76%) 14/18 (78%) 1.00 1.00
‘Doctor’ 20/35 (57%) 21/35 (60%) 1.00 1.00
‘Frequent user’ 7/14 (50%) 11/18 (61%) 0.79 1.00
Table 3 Respondents rating the questionnaires ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘extremely difficult’ to understand
DCE (%) CSPC (%) P-value Adjusted P
All respondents 19/154 (12%) 19/150 (13%) 1.00 1.00
‘Decision maker’ 5/33 (15%) 5/18 (28%) 0.47 1.00
‘Doctor’ 6/35 (17%) 5/35 (17%) 1.00 1.00
‘Frequent user’ 1/14 (7%) 2/18 (11%) 1.00 1.00
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Econometric analysis
Table 5 presents the model coeﬃcients and sig-
niﬁcance, marginal rates of substitution (MRS)
in terms of life years gained, and relative
importance weights and rankings for the DCE
and CSPC models. Although respondents to
the DCE and CSPC did not see the same
choice sets, there were only weak correlations
between the block indicator and the speciﬁc
attribute levels, ranging from 0.14 to 0.16,
suggesting no systematic bias in the attribute
levels presented in the two questionnaires.
Initial life expectancy and the number of
patients treated were not signiﬁcant at a 0.10
threshold in the initial DCE probit model, and
it was re-estimated excluding these attributes.
All attributes were signiﬁcant in the CSPC
model. The direction of preferences was consis-
tent between the two models: negative
Figure 1 Histogram of budget allocations.
Table 5 Model coefficients, marginal rates of substitution and importance ranks
Attribute Estimate Std. Error Coeff of Var Unadjusted P-value MRS(LYg) Rel. Importance Rank
DCE
Constant 0.158 0.048 0.303 <0.001***
Life years gained 0.086 0.011 0.133 <0.001*** 1.00 0.321 2
Age 0.008 0.001 0.147 <0.001*** 0.09 0.202 3
Initial utility 0.058 0.009 0.154 <0.001*** 0.67 0.019 4
Initial life expectancy
Final utility 0.138 0.012 0.086 <0.001*** 1.61 0.458 1
Patients treated/1000
CSPC
Constant 32.255 3.891 0.121 <0.001***
D Life years gained 7.298 0.420 0.057 <0.001*** 1.00 0.101 4
D Age 0.137 0.053 0.390 0.010* 0.02 0.013 6
D Initial utility 18.480 3.750 0.203 <0.001*** 2.53 0.228 2
D Initial life expectancy 2.995 0.411 0.137 <0.001*** 0.41 0.046 5
D Final utility 40.101 3.583 0.089 <0.001*** 5.49 0.496 1
D Patients treated / 1000 16.705 1.544 0.092 <0.001*** 2.29 0.116 3
MRS(LYg), marginal rate of substitution using life years gained as the numeraire.
Significance codes: *** <0.001, ** <0.01, * <0.05, + <0.10.
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coeﬃcients on age and initial utility suggest
that younger and more severe patients were
preferred, while positive coeﬃcients on individ-
ual life years gained and ﬁnal utility suggest
respondents preferred greater life year gains
and better ﬁnal health states. CSPC respon-
dents also preferred larger patients groups and,
unexpectedly, patients with greater initial life
expectancy, while these attributes were not sig-
niﬁcant in the DCE.
Marginal rates of substitution and relative
importance rankings, illustrated in Fig. 2, sug-
gest that ﬁnal health state was the single most
important attribute in both models, although
the rankings diverged for the other attributes.
After ﬁnal utility, the DCE emphasized life
years gained and patient age, while the CSPC
emphasized initial utility and then patients
treated and life years gained.
Discussion
The respondent-rated diﬃculty of the two sur-
veys was strikingly similar, with a small minority
rating the tasks as diﬃcult to understand and a
strong majority rating the tasks as diﬃcult to
answer. These ratings are reassuring as they sug-
gest that respondents were able to understand
the tasks and that the key challenge was sub-
stantive rather than cognitive. These ratings are
comparable to diﬃculty ratings reported by
Green and Gerard in a societal DCE,10 but as
ratings were only collected from respondents
that completed the questionnaires, they are most
likely biased downwards as individuals that
found the surveys exceedingly diﬃcult are likely
to have dropped out before completion.
The completion rate in the CSPC was signiﬁ-
cantly lower than the DCE, suggesting that it
was less acceptable in some respects, although
the CSPC response rate was similar to that
reported by Ratcliﬀe (38%) in her application
of CSPC.18 The lower completion rate despite
similar diﬃculty ratings supports the idea of a
completion bias in these ratings. It is interest-
ing to note that as a group, decision makers
expressed the greatest diﬃculty in answering
both questionnaires and had lower completion
rates in the CSPC survey compared to other
stakeholder subgroups. Keeney notes that a
desire to calculate a ‘correct’ value trade-oﬀ
despite the absence of any externally correct
judgements is a common error in decision mak-
ing,41 and such a phenomenon may be particu-
larly strong among decision-maker respondents
to the CSPC, which requires a more explicit
consideration of trade-oﬀs.
Respondents to the DCE questionnaire were
more consistent in preferring the same alterna-
tive in the repeated task compared to respon-
dents to the CSPC questionnaire. The choice
set that was used as the repeated task in the
DCE may have contributed to this consistency,
as 95% of respondents preferred the same
alternative in the original DCE task, compared
to only 77% in the original CSPC task. An
Figure 2 Relative attribute importance by survey.
ª 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Health Expectations
DCE vs. CSPC for the elicitation of societal preferences, C D Skedgel, A J Wailoo and R L Akehurst10
ideal test of consistency would have two alter-
natives with roughly equal choice probabilities,
but it was not possible to predict these proba-
bilities prior to the elicitations.
The proportion of dominant preferences in
the DCE (5%) and the CSPC (2%), including
preferences for aggregate QALYs gained and
equality in CSPC budget allocations, were less
than the 45% reported by Scott using a
DCE,28 and the 13% reported Schwappach16
with a CSPC, but greater than the 2.3%
reported by Ratcliﬀe,18 also with a CSPC.
Overall, respondents to the more cognitively
demanding CSPC appeared no more likely to
resort to this heuristic than respondents to the
DCE. Although the diﬀerence between the
DCE and CSPC was not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, the higher observed rate of dominant
preferences observed in the DCE may support
a notion that the more competitive nature of
the DCE task tended to focus attention on a
single attribute to a greater degree than the
more reﬂective CSPC.42
The low incidence of dominant preferences
for aggregate QALYs in both questionnaires
oﬀers little support for strict QALY maximiza-
tion and suggests that respondents gave more
weight to patient characteristics than aggregate
outcomes. This is particularly noteworthy in
the CSPC, where respondents may reasonably
have been expected to take the fact that aggre-
gate QALYs gained changed as they moved
the slider as a cue to focus on this attribute.
As above, this suggests that respondents to the
more complex CSPC were no more likely than
DCE respondents to resort to QALY maximi-
zation as a simplifying heuristic.
It is also worth noting that the predominant
preference in Schwappach’s CSPC elicitation16
was for equality in resources–a preference not
observed here. The unexpected willingness
among CSPC respondents to maximize alloca-
tions to a single group challenges previous
studies that found a general aversion to
extreme distributions16,18 and highlights the
value of explicitly testing for such preferences.
Although equal budgets were relatively fre-
quent among the CSPC responses, the relative
lack of strict equalizing behaviour observed
here seems noteworthy, as in the absence of
any obvious rationale for a particular budget
allocation, respondents may have been
expected to use an equalizing allocation (of
resources, patients or outcomes) as a heuristic
for a ‘fair’ allocation. Instead, consistent with
the underlying theory, it appeared that respon-
dents chose allocations based on the relative
utility of the paired alternatives.
In the econometric analysis, respondents to
both questionnaires had a strong preference for
patients who would ﬁnish treatment in the best
ﬁnal health state, with relative importance
weights close to 50%. But whereas the next
most important attribute in the CSPC was ini-
tial health state, where respondents preferred
patients in more severe initial health states,
DCE respondents assigned greater weight to
individual life year gains. Note that if all
respondents were strict QALY maximizers, it
would imply that attribute levels had no
impact on choices, and the regression coeﬃ-
cients, attribute importance and rates of substi-
tution would have no interpretation.28
Interestingly, CSPC respondents also had a
preference for larger patient groups, while the
number of patients was not statistically signiﬁ-
cant in the DCE. This result may be consistent
with a ‘prominence eﬀect’, which suggests that
respondents become more sensitive to a quantity
when it is harder for them to ignore.43,44 As
mentioned, the number of patients treated chan-
ged as respondents moved the budget slider,
potentially highlighting this attribute. In the
light of qualitative evidence that suggests SP
respondents may reduce abstract, macrolevel
allocation problems to more comprehensible
two-person analogies,45,46 such an eﬀect may be
an advantage in ‘nudging’ respondents back
towards a macrolevel perspective.44,47 These
results must be interpreted cautiously, though,
given the relatively small sample sizes and the
less than optimal application of the experimen-
tal design. Although there appeared to be no
systematic bias in the attribute levels of the two
blocks of the experimental design, it is not possi-
ble to say conclusively that observed diﬀerences
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between the two questionnaires were not the
result of respondents seeing diﬀerent choice sets.
In addition, there was little evidence to support
a prominence eﬀect with respect to aggregate
QALYs in respondent choices, particularly as
CSPC respondents were relatively less likely to
choose QALY-maximizing alternatives.
Although the DCE had better completion
rates and preference consistency, this ‘respon-
dent eﬃciency’48 must be weighed against the
richer preference data from the CSPC tasks.
Despite the greater complexity of the task, the
ability of CSPC to identify preferences for the
distribution of resources and/or outcomes, to
avoid uncomfortable extreme distributions and
possibly to align respondent attention more
closely with a societal perspective, appears to
oﬀer advantages over the more straightforward
DCE. Arguably, the ability to avoid absolute
discrimination against less-preferred groups
makes CSPC particularly appealing in eliciting
preferences in the context of health care, where
respondents may be likely to have ‘protected
values’49 or ‘rights-based’ preferences,28 over
which they may be reluctant to make or accept
absolute trade-oﬀs.17
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